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Abstract
The paper presents ConSpec, an automata based policy speciﬁcation language. The language trades oﬀ
clean semantics to language expressiveness; a formal semantics for the language is provided as security
automata. ConSpec speciﬁcations can be used at diﬀerent stages of the application lifecycle, rendering
possible the formalization of various policy enforcement techniques.
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1 Introduction
As mobile devices become increasingly popular, the problem of secure mobile appli-
cation development gains importance. Mobile devices contain personal information,
which users desire to protect. They also provide access to costly functionality, such
as GSM services and GPRS connections. Hiding these resources from third-party
applications would largely handicap application development for mobile platforms.
It seems necessary to provide controlled access to the sensitive resources through
ﬁne-grained, at times application speciﬁc, constraints on execution.
A security policy selects a set of acceptable executions from all possible execu-
tions and thus can be used to deﬁne how and under what conditions a sensitive
resource can be accessed. For instance, a user policy may limit the number of SMSs
that are sent by an application per hour in order to prevent spamming. The decision
for allowing access to a requested resource at a certain point of the program execu-
tion may depend on various factors, such as the previous actions of the application,
the state of the environment, the parameters of the request etc. The user may want
1 Partially supported by the S3MS project (http://s3ms.org).
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to forbid the sending of SMSs, for instance, after an application has accessed certain
local ﬁles.
A program adheres to a policy if all its executions are in the set of executions
selected by the policy. Several techniques exist to ensure that an application com-
plies to a policy. Static veriﬁcation techniques, such as model checking, analyze
the program code in order to construct a mathematical proof that no execution
of the program can violate the policy. Such an analysis is thorough and provides
full assurance, at the same time, it is costly and often requires human interaction.
Runtime monitoring can be used as an alternative to static checking. This security
enforcement mechanism observes the behavior of a target program and terminates
it if it does not respect the policy. Monitoring can eﬀectively enforce many inter-
esting security properties [14]. However, it creates performance overhead since each
security relevant action of the program should be detected and checked against the
policy. Monitoring may be performed explicitly, i.e. by a separate program which is
co-executed (executed in parallel) with the untrusted application. Due to expensive
interprocess communication however, this technique is costly. In order to reduce
this overhead, the monitor can instead be inlined in the untrusted program [5].
Then, the code of the program is interleaved with the code of the monitor.
We describe ﬁrst how security speciﬁcations can be enforced at the three stages
of the application lifecycle: the development, installation and runtime phases. The
goal is to combine static veriﬁcation and monitoring so that security properties
are enforced on mobile devices in the most eﬀective way. We associate with the
application a contract [4], a piece of data that describes the intended security-
relevant behavior of the program. The contract simpliﬁes tasks related to security
enforcement. In this sense, our framework is similar to that of model-carrying code
(MCC) introduced by Sekar et al [15]. In MCC, veriﬁcation is based on a model
of the program that is simpliﬁed to represent only security-relevant behavior, while
we do not necessarily obtain contracts by extraction.
A framework which spans diﬀerent stages of the application lifecycle and com-
bines diﬀerent techniques for ensuring compliance beneﬁts from a common language
for policy speciﬁcation. In turn, the diﬀerent aspects of the framework imposes dif-
ferent restrictions on such a language. The main contribution of this paper is the
language ConSpec (Contract Speciﬁcation Language) which can be used for spec-
ifying both user policies and application contracts. A semantics for ConSpec is
provided and the formal treatment of several activities in the framework is brieﬂy
explained based on this semantics.
The paper is structured as follows. In §2, we describe the lifecycle of the appli-
cation paired with its contract. In §3, we discuss design decisions behind ConSpec,
present its syntax and give a formal semantics to the language. Discussion of the
related work §5 and ﬁnal remarks §6 end the paper.
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Fig. 1. Security enforcement through application development phases
2 Security Enforcement in the Application Lifecycle
In this section, we describe how security enforcement techniques can be applied
throughout the lifecycle of an application and how the goals of all participants can
be achieved in the contract-aware framework. The lifecycle of the application and
the activities associated with each development phase are illustrated in Fig. 1. We
make use of the following scenario in the rest of the section:
Companies Alpha and Beta produce applications for mobile devices. Alpha devel-
ops application Weather that every morning at a user-deﬁned time sends an SMS
message to the operator’s weather service and displays to the user the forecast it
receives. Application HappyBirthday, produced by Beta, checks the user’s address
book and sends a congratulation SMS to each contact that has a birthday. Both
companies want their applications to be used by as many users as possible.
Alice is a user of the mobile device. She wants to download and use the third-
party applications. But she does not want these applications to break the policy “An
application must not send more than 5 SMSs messages per day”.
Development phase We assume that the developer is aware of typical secu-
rity policies and is willing to keep his application in conformance with them. From
the policies he learns which actions of the application are security-relevant. Using
this information he provides the application with the contract, which speciﬁes the
intended security-relevant behavior of application. At this phase, the policy lan-
guage is used for expressing this contract. The compliance of the contract and the
application can be checked, for instance, using static veriﬁcation by a trusted third
party, who then signs the application and the contract by its private key. This
analysis is performed by powerful machines rather than the mobile devices, and
can make use of knowledge available to the developer (e.g. program speciﬁcations,
annotations derived from the source code etc). Instead of signing the application
with a private key, proof-carrying code method [13] can be used to convey assurance
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in program-contract compliance. The application and the contract are supplied
with an easy-to-check proof of their compliance. If contract compliance can not be
statically veriﬁed, then an execution monitor can be inlined in the program at this
stage so that the compliance is ensured at runtime.
In our example scenario Alpha and Beta are not aware about the particular limit
of SMS messages that Alice allows. But they know that the number of messages
matters. Therefore, Alpha supplies the Weather application with the contract that
the application sends only one message per day. However, Beta developers cannot
tell in advance how many messages their application sends per day. For this reason,
the contract for their application is more complex. It tells that the application will
send one message to every contact from the address book that has a birthday.
Installation phase Before the program is installed on the device, a formal
check is needed to show that the security-relevant behavior of the application given
by the contract is acceptable by the user policy. If policies and contracts are cap-
tured with automata on inﬁnite strings, the problem of matching a policy against
a contract reduces to the language containment problem for such automata. The
complexity of this task (for example, the problem of language containment is unde-
cidable for two context-free languages [9,10]) severely restricts the expressive power
of the policy language. When the problem is decidable, however, contract-policy
matching is much simpler than checking the program itself, and is more likely to be
feasible on a mobile device [4].
In our scenario, the contract of Weather can be matched against Alice’s policy
“No more than 5 messages per day”. So this application is permitted to run at
the device without any modiﬁcations. But the contract of HappyBirthday cannot be
matched due to the lack of the precise number of messages the program can send. It
can still run on the device, after it undergoes inlining.
A policy that is not covered by the contract can be enforced by monitoring. If the
program is to be monitored explicitly, hooks that notify the monitor about ongoing
security-relevant activity should be injected to the program in the installation stage,
i.e. prior to execution. If the monitoring task is to be optimized in order to reduce
runtime overhead, the monitor for the desired policy should be inlined into the
program at this stage.
For instance, application Weather does not need to undergo inlining since its
compliance to the user’s policy has already been veriﬁed. But a monitor for Alice’s
policy is inlined in the HappyBirthday application to ensure that the application
does not send more than 5 messages.
Runtime At runtime, the behavior of an application may be checked against a
policy by monitoring. Because of the performance overhead created by monitoring,
it is preferable to use static methods described above and leave as little work to
runtime as possible. But in many cases, the application of other techniques is not
feasible (or not even possible due to, for example, the unavailability of the source
code), and runtime monitoring is the only solution to protect a system.
In our example, application Weather will not be monitored. But HappyBirthday
will, and if a violation is detected (that is, if the application is trying to send the
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6th message), it will be terminated. The behavior of the program will otherwise be
unaltered (except for the slight performance deterioration due to monitoring) and
the user will be able to freely enjoy its functionality.
3 ConSpec Language
The intention behind ConSpec is to design a language that can be exploited both
for speciﬁcation of requirements and for the description of the security-relevant
behavior of actual systems. For this reason, the formalism selected is based on
automata, which have been used for both purposes. For instance, the SPIN tool [8]
inputs system speciﬁcations as models written in the guarded-command language
Promela and performs model checking on the Bu¨chi automata extracted from these
models. Security properties are also expressed as automata in various approaches
(e.g. [14,15]).
ConSpec is strongly inspired by the policy speciﬁcation language PSLang, which
was developed by Erlingsson and Schneider [5] for runtime monitoring. PSLang poli-
cies consist of a set of variable declarations, followed by a list of security relevant
events, where each event is accompanied by a piece of Java-like code that speciﬁes
how the security state variables should be updated in case the event is encountered
in the current state. PSLang policies make monitor inlining simple: the updates
provided by the user can be almost directly inserted into the target program. How-
ever, this leads for making speciﬁcations less formal. A policy text is intended to
encode a security automaton: the state variables represent the automaton states
and updates represent transitions. While this intuition is given, the exact way to
extract the automaton from a PSLang policy is not provided. Such a task is not
trivial due to the power of the programming language constructs that can be used
in the updates.
Further we provide a formal semantics which maps ConSpec policies to formal
objects that can be used in constructing mathematical proofs. It is important to
note that ConSpec is a more restricted language than PSLang; this is a design
decision taken in order to allow application of formal methods for all stages of the
development process, and not just runtime monitoring. More speciﬁcally, ConSpec
does not allow arbitrary types in representing the security state and restricts the
way the security state variables are updated. We have used a guarded-command
language for the updates where the guards are side-eﬀect free and commands do
not contain loops. The simplicity of the language then allows for a comparatively
simple semantics. While the general ConSpec, which is the common language for
all tasks in the application lifecycle, is to be kept as simple as possible, speciﬁc
tasks may allow certain extensions. For instance, while putting conditions on heap
objects make matching undecidable, these are easily handled by monitor inlining.
A table that shows which features can be supported by diﬀerent tasks is included
in the Appendix.
ConSpec has a construct (Scope) for expressing security requirements on diﬀer-
ent levels. Case studies [16] show that many interesting real-life policies concern the
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MAXINT M
MAXLEN N
SCOPE <Object ClassName
| Session
| Multisession PersistentStateDec
| Global PersistentStateDec>
SECURITY STATE
PrimType SecVar1 = InitVal1
.
.
.
PrimType SecVarN = InitValN
Clause1
.
.
.
ClauseK
(a) Policy Syntax
<BEFORE
|EXCEPTIONAL
|AFTER [Type Name = ]> Signature
PERFORM
Guard1 -> {UpdateBlock1}
.
.
.
GuardM -> {UpdateBlockM}
[ ELSE -> {UpdateBlock } ]
(b) Event Clause Syntax
Fig. 2. ConSpec Syntax
entire execution history rather than a single run of the application, although most
policy languages (including PSLang) do not contain the feature of distinguishing
between events in the current run and in the previous runs. ConSpec is expres-
sive enough to write policies on multiple executions of the same application (scope
Multisession) and on executions of all applications of a system (scope Global),
in addition to policies on a single execution of the application (scope Session) and
on lifetimes of objects of a certain class (scope Object).
ConSpec Syntax Figure 2 summarizes the syntax of ConSpec policies. Before
the actual policy, ConSpec ﬁles set a limit on values of the type int which consist
of some initial segment of natural numbers. Similarly, maximum length of strings
are speciﬁed. We have skipped these in the example policy. Persistent state dec-
laration that follows the multi-session and global scopes is similar to security state
declaration and aims to specify the state that is preserved across single executions.
An event clause (see Figure 2(b) for syntax) gives us a security relevant action
and its modiﬁer. The events that we are considering security relevant are method
invocations. These methods can be system calls or methods provided by an API.
In order to resolve which method is of interest in case of overloading, the argument
types of the method is to be speciﬁed as part of the action speciﬁcation. The security
relevant action is then fully speciﬁed by its signature which consists of the name of
the method, the class to which the method belongs and the types of its arguments.
The signature of an event clause is deﬁned as the signature of the method associated
with it. In ConSpec policies, all event clauses with the same modiﬁer have a unique
signature. This restriction means that one can not, for example, have two BEFORE
clauses for the same method. The restriction has been imposed in order to ensure
determinism. Notice that since the signature does not include the type of the return
variable, it is not possible to have two AFTER event clauses for the same method,
even if they do not agree on the return variable types. The modiﬁer states when the
update to the state will be performed: will the guards be evaluated before the event,
after the event or immediately after the throwing of an exception by the event.
The event speciﬁcation is followed by a sequence of guard-update block pairs.
The update speciﬁes how a state will be updated for the security relevant action
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while the guard selects the states, which the particular update will apply, as a subset
of all states. The guards are considered from top to bottom. In case none of them is
true, there is no transition for that action from the current state. If an ELSE block
is present, however, the update of this block is executed in case none of the guards
above it are satisﬁed. The guard is a side-eﬀect free boolean expression which can
mention only the set of argument values (and the return value for the case of AFTER
modiﬁer), and the security state. The update block begins with declarations of the
local variables, which have the current block as their scope. A list of assignments to
local variables and security state variables follow the declarations. If no assignments
are present, the update block consists of the statement skip.
The expression language of ConSpec has been designed to ensure that checking
language containment of the induced automata (the matching problem) is decid-
able. The security state variables of ConSpec are restricted to the primitive types
(PrimType ): booleans, integers, and strings. All other variables can be of the gen-
eral type (Type ), which includes both primitive types and classes. The boolean
expressions in guards can also include ﬁeld accesses using object references. Field
access is expressed by the “.” operator. The expressions on integers are built using
basic arithmetic and comparison operators. Strings can be checked for equality and
the preﬁx relation using the functions equals and beginsWith respectively.
An example policy
The policy “An application must not overwrite local ﬁles and after it has accessed
an existing ﬁle, it should get approval from the user before opening a connection” is
expressed in ConSpec as follows:
SCOPE Session SECURITY STATE
bool accessed = false;
bool permission = false;
BEFORE File.Open(string path, string mode, string access) PERFORM
mode.equals("CreateNew") -> { skip; }
mode.equals("Open") && access.equals("OpenRead") -> { accessed= true; }
BEFORE Connection.Open(string type, string address) PERFORM
!accessed -> { permission= false; }
accessed && permission -> { permission = false; }
AFTER string answer= GUI.AskConnect() PERFORM
answer.equals("Yes") -> { permission = true; }
!answer.equals("Yes") -> { permission = false; }
We begin by specifying that the policy applies to each single execution of an
application. Scope declaration is followed by the security state declaration: the se-
curity state of the example policy is represented by the boolean variables accessed
and permission, which are both false initially to mark, respectively, that no ﬁle has
been accessed and that no permissions are granted when the program begins exe-
cuting. The example policy contains three event clauses that state the conditions
for and eﬀect of the security relevant actions: call to the method File.Open, call
to the method Connection.Open and return from the method GUI.AskConnect.
The types of the method arguments are speciﬁed along with representative names,
which have the event clause as their scope. The modiﬁers BEFORE and AFTER
mark whether the call of or the normal return from the method speciﬁed in the
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event clause is security relevant (exceptional returns can be speciﬁed by the modi-
ﬁer EXCEPTIONAL). Event clauses contain guards and associated updates to the
security state variables.
ConSpec Semantics We give semantics to policies written in ConSpec
through a particular class of security automata which we term ConSpec automata.
Notation. In the text below, we ﬁx a set of class names C, and method names M
ranged over by c ∈ C and m ∈ M, respectively. We assume that types are ranged
over by τ . The set of all values of type τ is denoted as ‖τ‖. The set of all values is
V al = ∪
τ
‖τ‖ while the set of values of the type int, boolean or string is PrimV al.
We take τLOC to be the object reference type, and LOC = ‖τLOC‖ is the set of
addresses in the heap. Heaps map locations to functions which in turn map a set
of ﬁeld names to values. Heaps are then deﬁned as partial functions from addresses
(from the set LOC) to objects. We take Θ as the set of all possible heaps, so for
h ∈ Θ, h : LOC ⇀ FV ar → V al.
ConSpec Automata In ConSpec automata, security relevant actions are
method calls, represented by the class name and the method name of the method,
along with a sequence of values that represent the actual argument list of the
method. We partition the set of security relevant actions into a set of before actions
A and a set of after actions A, corresponding to method invocations and returns.
Both refer to the heap prior to method invocation, while the latter also refers to
the heap upon termination and to a return value from RVal = V al ∪ {⊥, ε} where
ε and ⊥ are used to model return from a void method and return on an exception
raised during the method call.
A ⊆ C×M×Val∗ ×Θ
A ⊆ RVal× C×M×Val∗ ×Θ×Θ
The partitioning on security relevant actions induces a corresponding partitioning
on the transition function δ of ConSpec automata. We present a deterministic
version of security automata.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (ConSpec Automaton) A ConSpec automaton is a tuple A =
(Q,A, δ, q0), where:
(i) Q is a countable set of states,
(ii) q0 ∈ Q is the initial state,
(iii) A = A∪A is a countable set of security relevant actions as described above, and
(iv) δ = δ ∪ δ is a (partial) transition function, where δ : Q × A ⇀ Q and δ :
Q×A ⇀ Q.
The enforcement language of a ConSpec automaton A is deﬁned as the set LA∪
LA ·A
, where LA is the language of A in the standard sense. It is the enforcement
language which deﬁnes the security policy induced by a ConSpec automaton.
Automaton Extraction From Policy Text The semantics of a ConSpec
policy P is given in terms of a ConSpec automaton AP = (Q,A, δ, q0) as described
below.
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States. The set of states Q of AP , also called security states, is determined by
the declarations in the SECURITY STATE block of the policy P. Consider the security
state declaration of P:
SECURITY STATE τs1 s1 = v1
...
τsk sk = vk
The set of variable names that are induced by such a state declaration is the set of
security state variables. SVar = {s1, . . . , sk}. The states q ∈ Q of the automaton
are mappings from variable names to values which respect the types of the security
state variables: q : SVar → V al. The initial state q0 simply maps the security state
variables to their initial values: ∀si ∈ SVar . q0(si) = vi.
Actions. The actions A of the automaton are determined by the events men-
tioned in event clauses of the policy. An action a = 〈c,m, (v1, . . . , vn), h〉 is a
security relevant before action, a ∈ A, if and only if the ConSpec policy contains
an event clause:
BEFORE c.m (τ1 x1, . . . , τn xn) <body>
where v1 ∈ ‖τ1‖, . . . , vn ∈ ‖τn‖. Similarly, an action a = 〈v, c,m, (v1, . . . , vn), h, h
′〉
where v is a value v, ε, or ⊥, is a security relevant after action, a ∈ A, if and only
if the ConSpec policy contains an event clause:
AFTER τ x = c.m (τ1 x1, . . . , τn xn) <body> or
AFTER c.m (τ1 x1, . . . , τn xn) <body> or
EXCEPTIONAL c.m (τ1 x1, . . . , τn xn) <body>
respectively, where v1 ∈ ‖τ1‖, . . . , vn ∈ ‖τn‖ and v ∈ ‖τ‖.
Transitions. Each event clause of the policy induces a partial transition function.
The transition functions δ and δ of the automaton are the union of the partial
functions corresponding to event clauses with the BEFORE and AFTER/EXCEPTIONAL
modiﬁer, respectively. The deﬁnition of the partial functions is similar for both
types of event clauses; the diﬀerence is that the transitions of δ also contain the
return value when the method has some other return type than void (and the
constant ε when the return type is void). For brevity, here we only describe this
more general case.
Consider an AFTER event clause ϕ:
AFTER τ x = c.m (τ1 x1, . . . , τn xn)
PERFORM
Guard1 -> UpdateBlock1
..
.
Guardm -> UpdateBlockm
Let AVar = {x1, . . . , xn} be the set of formal arguments of the event and PVar =
{x}∪AV ar be the set of all program variables of the event clause. Below, let states
q ∈ Q be as deﬁned above, and let σ : PVar → Val range over the set Σ of mappings
from program variables to values which respect the declared types of the variables.
For guards Guardj , or Gj for short, and every blocks UpdateBlockj , or Uj for short,
of ϕ, we assume the semantic functions:
Gj : Q×Σ×Θ×Θ → {True, False}
Uj : Q ×Σ×Θ×Θ → Q
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where the two heaps in the function types refer to the heap of the program before
and after the execution of the method call, respectively. The ELSE keyword used as
a guard would then correspond to the guard true.
The ConSpec language refers to ﬁelds of object references by using the standard
“.” notation. Semantics of such expressions are relativized on heaps. The heap is
not changed by the automata, but is only used to look up ﬁelds of object references.
Below, we denote the heap before the call with h, and the heap after the call with
h. Then, the value of ﬁeld access expressions are as follows:
Var.Field =
{
h(σ(Var ))(Field ) if Var ∈ AVar
h(σ(Var ))(Field ) if Var = x
Then, every event clause ϕ induces a partial mapping p : Q×A ⇀ Q as follows.
For a security state q and after action a = 〈v, c,m, (v1, . . . , vn), h, h
′〉, we deﬁne
p(q, a) = q′ if there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that:
• Gj(q, σ, h
, h) and
• ∀i < j.¬(Gi(q, σ, h
, h)) and
• Uj(q, σ, h
, h) = q′
where σ : PVar → Val is deﬁned by the correspondence of actual to formal param-
eters induced by (v1, . . . , vn) and the return value v. This deﬁnition captures that
the guards are evaluated in order from top to bottom in order to select the right
update block.
Finally, the after -transition function δ is the union of the functions induced by
each event clause (with disjoint domains):
δ =
⊎
ϕ∈P
p
4 ConSpec in Use
The main advantage of ConSpec is that it allows for a formal treatment of the
various enforcement techniques mentioned in Section 2 through its automata-based
semantics. Here we brieﬂy explain how this can be achieved.
Static check If the contract of the application is formalized in ConSpec
model then static check can be performed by translating the corresponding security
automaton into Spec# constraints and verifying the resulting speciﬁcation. The
approach is described in more details in [1].
Matching One way to match a ConSpec contract against a ConSpec policy
is to check that the language of the contract automaton is included in the language
of the policy automaton. Since the domains of the security state variables are
bounded, the extracted automata have ﬁnitely many states and standard methods
for checking language inclusion for automata can be facilitated for contract-policy
matching (see for instance [3]).
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Monitoring Given a program and a ConSpec policy with scope Session,
the concept of monitoring can be formalized by deﬁning the co-execution of the
corresponding ConSpec automaton with the program. Such co-executions are a
subset of the set of interleavings of the individual executions of the program and
the automaton. Co-executions satisfy the following condition: when the execution
of the program component is projected to its security relevant action executions,
each before action is immediately preceded by a transition of the automaton for the
same action; dually, each after action is immediately followed by a corresponding
automaton transition. Therefore it is simple to show that the program component
of the co-execution adheres to the given policy, as the co-execution includes an
accepting trace of the automaton for the program execution.
Monitor Inlining Inlining a ConSpec policy with scope Session can be per-
formed similar to inlining a PSLang policy (see [6,5] for details). A class deﬁnition
is added to the target program which stores the security state variables. Then the
program is rewritten so that each security relevant method call is wrapped with
code compiled from the corresponding event clause(s) of the policy. Such a code
segment evaluates the guards of the event clause from top to bottom and executes
the updates associated with the ﬁrst guard that is satisﬁed. If none of the guards
evaluate to true, the program is terminated. The modiﬁer of the event clause deter-
mines where this segment is placed relative to the method call. The correctness of
such a monitor inlining scheme can be proven by setting up a bisimulation relation
between the states of the inlined program and the states of the co-execution of the
original program with the ConSpec automaton (of the policy).
5 Related work and conclusion
There exists a number of automata-based languages for security policy speciﬁcation.
Amongst these, ConSpec is closest to PSLang [5] which has also introduced the
modiﬁers used in ConSpec. The language is intended solely for runtime monitoring
and freely uses programming language constructs such as abstractions and functions.
This enables a larger class of policies to be speciﬁed but also complicates the task of
providing a formal semantics. Since the authors do not provide such a formalisation,
their monitor inlining algorithm for PSLang is to be trusted on intuition as no
proof of its correctness can be constructed. The Polymer language [2] has the same
drawback. Polymer policies consist of Java classes which, when inlined, may trigger
various actions in case of violation. For instance, it is possible to execute some
recovery action as a response to the violation, after which the application is allowed
to progress. Polymer policies implement edit automata [12], which extend security
automata. But the correctness of the Polymer policy inlining cannot be proven
either, as its semantics is not formally presented.
Many languages use logic-based formalisms to express security properties [7].
However, it seems that these languages are less convenient for speciﬁcation of the
existing systems automata-based languages, as it is hard to represent the full be-
havior of the system through a limited set of temporal-logic properties. Yet, in
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our framework we need a formalism convenient for speciﬁcation of both programs
and requirements to them. Moreover, temporal logic formulae can be translated to
automata by applying a tableaux procedure [11].
The model-carrying code approach [15] is based on the idea of supplying un-
trusted code with additional information to simplify its veriﬁcation against user
policies. In MCC, this additional information is an extended ﬁnite state automata
that is extracted from the program and that represents the program’s security rel-
evant behavior. However, the current framework allows only equality checks to be
performed on the program variables, while our language allows more sophisticated
expressions, including basic arithmetic operations and comparisons of numeric val-
ues; on the other hand, we use ﬁnite domains for security variables. Furthermore,
our framework does not rely entirely on monitoring for enforcing code-contract com-
pliance. In many cases, the compliance can be veriﬁed statically and run without
performance overhead.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented the policy language ConSpec, which has been designed
for formalizing security requirements as well as representing the security-relevant
behavior of the application. ConSpec speciﬁcations can be used for various tasks
during all stages of the application lifecycle to ensure that the application conforms
to the user policy. The main features of ConSpec are this universality and its tight
connection with the underlying formalism, which is a fundamental component of
formal proofs of policy adherence.
In the scope of the S3MS project, we are formalizing enforcement techniques
using ConSpec as summarized in Section 4. However, we currently consider sequen-
tial programs only. As future work, we aim to extend our approach to applications
where multiple threads can perform security-relevant actions. Such a setting brings
about synchronization issues as mutually dependent events may occur in diﬀerent
threads and data used by the monitor for decision-making may be shared between
threads. Thus, formalizing monitoring of multi-threading environments emerges as
a challenging problem.
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Appendix: ConSpec Features for Diﬀerent Tasks
As extensions to the current language ConSpec, introducing object reference and
list types as security state types emerge as beneﬁcial features considering real-
life policies. The list type makes simple iteration meaningful to include in the
update language, to enable, for instance, updating all elements of a list. The update
language then can be extended with a simple construct that iterates over ﬂat lists.
Extensions to the language should be considered thoroughly, as these may introduce
undecidability of various tasks identiﬁed in our framework. Here we provide a table
that shows which extensions to the language can be handled by the various tasks
in the framework. The constructs of ConSpec are speciﬁed in the rows of the tables
below, whereas the activities are speciﬁed in the columns.
Construct Static
analysis
Monitoring Matching
Policy scope
Scope object + + +
Scope session + + +
Scope multi session - + +
Scope global - + +
State declaration
Bounded integers - + +
Bounded strings - + +
Booleans + + +
Object ref. - + -
Lists (of the above) - + -
Unbounded versions the above types - + -
Command
Local variable declaration - + -
Assignment + + +
Conditional branch - + -
For-loop - + -
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